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Using Federal Power to Compel Fire Prevention
and Address Growing Property Insurance Issues in
Wildland-Urban Interface
Brandon A. Prince*

ABSTRACT
The Western United States continues to experience devastating
wildfire seasons. These severe disasters worsen as climate change
lengthens periods of aridity and hotter temperatures. Despite this
longstanding and well-documented forecast, wildland-urban interface
(“WUI”) development has continued without much restriction over the past
thirty years. Insurers who once issued policies in these western WUI
regions now experience substantial losses on an annual basis and are
reconsidering their approach to market participation in fire-prone areas.
In areas with acute fire destruction like California, insurers’ resulting rate
increases and non-renewals have forced state government intervention to
protect property owners. This tension is emblematic of the growing
property insurance problem facing the United States and other western
WUI areas that forecast a growing wildfire problem within the next
century. Drawing on previous discussions, this article outlines detailed
policy components for a federal National Wildfire Insurance Program that
would offer wildfire insurance to individuals in participating communities
concerned with fire risk. In particular, this article attempts to outline
program features and mechanisms that would avoid large-scale debt like
that of the National Flood Insurance Program.
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INTRODUCTION
Wildfires are no longer a seasonal event in the West.1 As climate
change warms and dries out the region, much of the landscape is now
susceptible to brush and forest fires throughout the year. This drier wildland
also contains overly dense undergrowth due to over a century of federal fire
management that has prioritized complete suppression in favor of
preventative measures to manage areas historically familiar with fire.2 But
the increased aridity, warmer temperatures, and excessive tinder only
partially explain why the United States suffered five of its worst wildfire
years since 2006.3
The broader issue involves rapid human expansion into fire-prone
western areas. The United States Forest Service (“USFS”) designates these
fire-prone areas as “Wildland-Urban Interface” (“WUI”) because they exist
“where humans meet or intermix with wildland fuel.” 4 WUI is the fastest
growing land use in the contiguous United States, and ninety-seven percent
of this development occurred to support new housing.5 There were 12.7
million more houses and 25 million more individuals living in WUI in 2010

1. Facts + Statistics: Wildfires, INS. INFO. INST., https://perma.cc/MHF6-5DHE. The
top ten costliest wildfires in U.S. history have all occurred in California; nine of them were
in the last fifteen years, and eight were in the last five years. Id. All of Colorado’s eleven
largest wildfires have occurred since 2002, and three of them occurred in 2020 alone. Terry
Terrones, The 11 Biggest Wildfires in Colorado History, GAZETTE (Nov. 27, 2020),
https://perma.cc/57WU-2LPG. The 2002 Rodeo-Chediski fire burned 200,000 hectares and
destroyed almost 500 homes in Arizona’s White Mountains. Timothy W. Collins & Bob
Bolin, Situating Hazard Vulnerability: People’s Negotiations with Wildfire Environments
in the U.S. Southwest, 44 ENV’T MGMT. 441, 441 (2009).
2. KATIE HOOVER & LAURA A. HANSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10244, WILDFIRE
STATISTICS 2 (2021). In 2019, seventy-two percent of the acreage burned in the West was
on federal lands. Id. Preventative measures in forests include prescribed burning,
mechanical thinning, and timber harvesting. See Jeffrey P. Prestemon et al., Understanding
Broadscale Wildfire Risks in a Human-Dominated Landscape, 48 FOREST SCI. 685, 685
(2002).
3. HOOVER & HANSON, supra note 2, at 1 (indicating that the five worst fire years on
record since 1960 in terms of acreage burned are 2020, 2015, 2017, 2006, and 2007,
respectively.).
4. 40 C.F.R. §80.1401 (2021). Wildland vegetation typically includes forest, native
grasslands, shrubs, wetlands, and transitional lands between developed areas and wildlands.
Volker C. Radeloff et al., The Wildland-Urban Interface in the United States, 15
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 799, 800 (2005).
5. Volker C. Radeloff et al., Rapid Growth of the US Wildland-Urban Interface
Raises Wildfire Risk, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 3314, 3314 (2018). Wildfires will
become a larger threat to other WUI communities throughout the U.S. as the climate
continues to warm and the number of fire-causing humans grows within and near vegetation.
See generally Emily K. Brown et al., US Wildfire Potential: A Historical View and Future
Projection Using High Resolution Climate Data, ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Mar. 8, 2021, at 1
(projecting that most of the contiguous U.S. would experience about 90-189 more days per
year exceeding the historical local maximum Keetch-Byram Drought Index).
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than in 1990.6 The increase in human activity among dry wildland has led
to a rise in human-caused fires from sources like power lines, fuel tanks,
general commercial activity, and individual sources. Examples of
individual sources of human-caused fires are cigarettes, private fires,
campfires, deliberate ignition, and sparks.
Despite worsening fire trends, it is unlikely that the United States
population will stop developing WUI areas. The area is an attractive living
space for many citizens who prefer natural settings, open space, and the
possibility of property ownership.7 This predicament places western WUI
settlements in a situation like the flood-prone regions of the United States:
both regions must manage entrenched and expanding settlements in an area
prone to increasingly severe and predictable natural disasters.
Private property insurance companies are beginning to take steps to
curb extensive wildfire losses.8 Much like insurers in floodplain regions
before the establishment of the National Flood Insurance Program
(“NFIP”), property insurance companies operating in particularly high-risk
western WUI areas are either refusing to renew policies or charging
increasingly unaffordable rates.9 This area of high fire vulnerability within
the WUI will continue to expand as drier, hotter weather continues.
However, the pace of development in WUI and tendency to rebuild in
affected wildfire areas forecasts two successive problems: private
insurance will continue to face losses in broader areas of WUI with each
fire season and then raise rates to compensate for loss or leave the market
entirely. This situation creates a significant problem for the large and
diverse population occupying the WUI who may face the dual risk of
wildfires,10 as well as the financial liability from an underinsured property.
As this insurance problem manifests, the burden falls on state and
federal resources in addition to the property owners themselves. Individuals
who lose coverage due to non-renewal or unaffordability usually resort to
6. Kendra Pierre-Louis & Jeremy White, Americans Are Moving Closer to Nature,
and to Fire Danger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/T9V2-8BCQ.
7. See infra Part I(c).
8. Don Jergler, Wildfires Making Insurance Harder to Find, California Department
of Insurance Says, INS. J. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/7EYV-J328; Nick Cahill,
Insurers Busy Dropping California Homes and Businesses Over Wildfires, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/389R-ZXLQ.
9. These increased rates are “unaffordable” but also likely reflect an accurate
assessment of the home’s exorbitant risk.
10. See Matthew S. Carroll et al., Community Diversity and Wildfire Risk: An
Archetype Approach to Understanding Local Capacity To Plan for, Respond to, and
Recover from Wildfires 3, 4–5 (Univ. of Oregon, Inst. for a Sustainable Env’t, Ecosystem
Workforce Program Working Paper No. 50, 2014) (“Four distinct archetypes [in the WUI]
emerged . . . : 1) formalized suburban communities; 2) high amenity, high resource
communities; 3) rural lifestyle communities and; 4) working landscape/resource dependent
communities. . . . [T]he social context of many WUI communities is in flux and
communities can evolve over time” (citations omitted).).
152

Using Federal Power to Compel Fire Prevention

state-funded Fair Access to Insurance Requirement (“FAIR”) Plan
programs.11 These programs provide a basic “named perils insurance
policy” to property owners that covers wildfire loss.12 Federal disaster aid
and grant assistance additionally provide a significant wildfire recovery
funding source for both individuals and the public.13
Given this increasing federal burden and the presence of wildfire
across multiple states and federal land,14 the federal government should
address the growing property insurance problem in WUI areas with a
National Wildfire Insurance Program (“NWIP”). Like the NFIP, the federal
government would provide wildfire insurance to WUI communities that
agree to adopt rigid building codes and land-use restrictions to mitigate fire
damage. The program will also require a mandatory purchase requirement
resembling the federally-backed mortgage requirement in the NFIP. 15
However, unlike the NFIP, premiums under this program would accurately
reflect the risk facing the structure, and insurance companies would provide
rate subsidies to reward citizens that enact “fire-hardening” measures on
their property.16 This program will allow homeowners who desire to remain

11. Private insurance companies also subsidize some state FAIR plan programs. See,
e.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 10095(a) (West 2021) (“An insurer described in this subdivision shall
be a member of the association and shall remain a member as a condition of its authority to
transact those kinds of insurance in this state.”).
12. See Julia Kagan, Named Perils Insurance Policy, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://perma.cc/5D2X-6JSR (“A named perils insurance policy is a home insurance
. . . policy that only provides coverage on losses incurred to your property from hazards or
events named on the policy. Named peril coverage may be purchased as a less expensive
alternative to a comprehensive coverage or broad policies, which are policies that tend to
offer coverage to most perils.”); see infra Part II(b)(i). For a discussion of state FAIR plans,
see infra Part II(b)(i) (wealthier WUI residents have the option to purchase insurance on the
surplus line market). See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CHANGING WILDFIRE RISK
ON CALIFORNIA’S RESIDENTIAL I NSURANCE MARKET 31 (2018) (“[P]roperties that end up in
the surplus lines market are those that could not be covered at rates approved for the admitted
market. The surplus lines market is also known for writing ‘high end’ homes with unique
features what may require more-specific coverage requirements.”).
13. See infra Part I(b). See Oregon Wildfires and Straight-Line Winds, Disaster
Recovery No. DR-4562-OR, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (last updated Feb. 8, 2022),
https://perma.cc/3NF5-DARU (disaster aid still available for the 2020 Oregon wildfires,
$38.6 million approved for individuals and households, $356 million obligated for public
assistance). See also California Wildfires, Disaster Record No. DR-4558-CA, FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (last updated Feb. 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/DR8G-Q6QY
(aid also still available for the 2020 California wildfires, $23.1 million approved for
individuals and households, $311 million obligated for public assistance); California
Wildfires, Disaster Record No. DR-4569-CA, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (last
updated May 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/G59G-8M5N.
14. See infra Part I(c).
15. See infra Parts III(b), V(b).
16. See, e.g., Is Your Home Hardened to Survive a Wildfire Ember Storm?, CAL. FIRE
SAFE COUNCIL (2019), https://perma.cc/6B9Z-REQT (“FIRE HARDENED means your
home is prepared for wildfire and an ember storm. It does not mean fireproof. Home
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in high-risk wildfire settings to continue receiving property insurance
coverage, and effect preventative measures on private lands that
supplement local, state, and federal fire mitigation efforts.
Some existing literature discusses a federal wildfire insurance
program to address the property insurance problem in WUI areas.17 This
article continues these discussions by drawing on developments in NFIP
rate calculations, the considerable rise of non-renewals in California in
2019 and 2020, and the general rise of insurance premiums in western WUI
communities.18 This article also offers approaches for the NWIP to mitigate
and avoid large debts following a wave of fire-related disasters.19
As described in more detail in Part V below, this article proposes a
model:
•

using individual property assessment to calculate realistic premium
costs, much like NFIP’s Risk Rating 2.0; 20
using these individual risk rates to create attractive premium
subsidies in exchange for undertaking fire-hardening measures on
the property;21
collecting risk data and land survey data annually from property
owners to update community maps;
imposing strict requirements on municipalities participating in the
program in exchange for insurance and grant funding (including
building and zoning standards, mandatory condemnation of severe
repetitive loss properties (“SRLs”),22 and voluntary buyout
programs);

•
•
•

hardening addresses the most vulnerable components of your house with building materials
and installation techniques that increase resistance to heat, flames, and embers that
accompany most wildfires.”); HARDENING YOUR HOME, CAL. FIRE, https://perma.cc/Q5ZRH33Z.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See Colorado Wildfire Information, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INS. INFO. ASS’N,
https://perma.cc/99FF-SKRA (“Homeowners need to be aware of the steps they should take
to prevent wildfire AND be aware of the insurance impact before moving or building in
high-risk areas.”).
19. See infra Part III (explaining that repeated hurricanes in the 2000s and 2010s
brought significant debt to the NFIP).
20. See infra Part V(a).
21. See generally Fire Safety Information for Residents, CALIF. FIRE SAFE COUNCIL,
https://perma.cc/T54E-TDM2 (“Fire hardened means your home is prepared for wildfire
and an ember storm. It does not mean fireproof. Home hardening addresses the most
vulnerable components of your house with building materials and installation techniques
that increase resistance to heat, flames, and embers that accompany most wildfires.”).
22. In the flooding context, SRLs are structures under an NFIP plan that have:
incurred flood-related damage for which 4 or more separate claims payments have been
made under flood insurance coverage under this chapter, with the amount of each such claim
exceeding $5,000, and with the cumulative amount of such claims payments exceeding
$20,000; or for which at least 2 separate claims payments have been made under such
154
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•
•

lessening the federal government’s fire suppression costs over
time; and
creating new federal investments for increased future prevention
programs (including prescribed burns, tree-thinning, and citizen
education).

The proposed program will not foreclose private insurers from
providing wildfire insurance separately or as part of a broader plan but will
instead offer an alternative for communities seeking competitive rates, firehardening strategies, and a guarantee that residents will not lose access to
affordable property insurance coverage.23
To outline this proposal, Part I of this article explains the WUI, its
characteristics, and its historical development trends in the West. Part II
discusses the problems insurers and property owners face in the WUI,
leading to non-renewals, unaffordable rates, and government intervention.
Part III discusses the NFIP and the parallel problem of insurance risk in
floodplain regions of the United States. It also discusses the elements of the
NFIP that work and the program features that led to its massive debt. Part
IV examines the existing literature on federal wildfire insurance programs.
Part V introduces an NWIP proposal for WUI municipalities to manage
community risk and ensure citizens can access wildfire insurance and
affordable property insurance. Finally, Part VI discusses the foreseeable
challenges to an NWIP proposal given potentially high insurance rates, the
contentious state of the NFIP, political backlash, the high cost of property
in parts of WUI, and the need to continue federal funding of wildfire
suppression efforts.

PART I: WUI IS HERE TO STAY: BACKGROUND ON THE
AREA’S RAPID GROWTH AND PARALLEL RISK
INCREASE
A. OVERVIEW OF THE “WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE”
Wildland-Urban Interface (“WUI”) is the area “where humans meet
or intermix with wildland fuel.”24 Specifically, it is “the area where houses
and wildland vegetation meet or intermingle, and where wildfire problems
coverage, with the cumulative amount of such claims exceeding the value of the insured
structure. 42 U.S.C. § 4104c(h)(3) (2012).
23. For a broader discussion of how private insurers can compete alongside a federal
disaster insurance program, see generally CAROLYN KOUSKY ET AL., WHARTON RISK MGMT.
& DECISION PROCESSES CTR., THE EMERGING PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL FLOOD INSURANCE
MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES (2018).
24. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1401 (2021). Wildland “fuel” is “[c]ombustible material” and
“[i]ncludes[] vegetation, such as grass, leaves, ground litter, plants, shrubs and trees, that
feed a fire.” NAT’L PARK SERV., Fire Terminology, https://perma.cc/BJH3-STZE (last
visited Apr. 19, 2022).
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are most pronounced.”25 There are two particular classifications of WUI
development, intermix and interface, which are the focus of wildfire
problems. Intermix WUI communities are those where properties and
wildland vegetation intermingle and coexist.26 Alternatively, interface WUI
communities are clusters of settlements that border large areas of wildland
vegetation.27
“[A]t-risk communit[ies]” within western WUI are experiencing this
increased wildfire threat due to prolonged hot weather,28 man-made and
natural fire hazards, and developments that border or mix with dry
vegetation.29 Human-caused ignition from sources like private burns,
campfires, landscaping equipment, cigarettes, power lines, and other sparkemitting sources are a paramount concern in WUI areas experiencing drier
conditions.
Proper hazard prevention and response to wildfire in intermix and
interface areas require an examination of the different characteristics within
each WUI development category.30 “Census-based and point-based WUI
maps, respectively, classified 86% and 97% of all of the buildings lost in
WUI disasters as being in either the WUI interface or intermix.” 31 Although
studies differ on which of the two WUI areas experiences a higher rate of
building destruction,32 the high incidence of fire in both settings requires a
25. Radeloff et al., supra note 5.
26. See infra Part I(a)(i).
27. See infra Part I(a)(ii).
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 6511(1) (“The term ‘at-risk community’ means an area . . . in
which conditions are conducive to a large-scale wildland fire disturbance event; and for
which a significant threat to human life or property exists as a result of a wildland fire
disturbance event.”). See also John T. Abatzoglou & A. Park Williams, Impact of
Anthropogenic Climate Change on Wildfire Across Western US Forests, 113 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIS. 11770, 11770 (2016) (“We demonstrate that human-caused climate change
caused over half of the documented increases in fuel aridity since the 1970s and doubled the
cumulative forest fire area since 1984. This analysis suggests that anthropogenic climate
change will continue to chronically enhance the potential for western US forest fire activity
while fuels are not limiting.”).
29. Notice, Urban Wildland Interface Communities Within the Vicinity of Federal
Lands that Are at High Risk from Wildfire, 66 Fed. Reg. 751–52 (Jan. 4, 2001) [hereinafter
Urban Wildland Interface Communities].
30. Roger B. Hammer et al., Wildland-Urban Interface Housing Growth During the
1990s in California, Oregon, and Washington, 16 INT’L J. WILDLAND FIRE 255, 256 (2007).
But see David M. Theobald & William H. Romme, Expansion of the US Wildland–Urban
Interface, 83 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 340, 341–42 (2007) (excluding the characterization
of occluded WUI in the discussion of wildland fires). See also Urban Wildland Interface
Communities, supra note 29, at 753 (describing occluded WUI as one that “generally exists
in a situation, often within a city, where structures abut an island of wildland fuels” with “a
clear line of demarcation between structures and wildland fuels”).
31. Michael D. Caggiano et al., Building Loss in WUI Disasters: Evaluating the Core
Components of the Wildland-Urban Interface Definition, FIRE, Dec. 2020, at 1, 12.
32. Id. at 12 (using data from 70 U.S. wildfires between 2000-2018, a study by
Caggiano found that “building loss mostly occurs in areas with low building densities and
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response that incorporates their different landscape characteristics and
engages the agencies handling fire response.33
1.

Intermix

Intermix WUI development “exists where structures are scattered
throughout a wildland area . . . [and] there is no clear line of demarcation”
between the wildland and settlement.34 These areas have between 28 and
250 people per square mile.35 Structural density is varied and ranges from
one structure per forty acres to clusters of structures built closely together.36
Numerous factors associated with this low-density characteristic
make intermix WUI “more difficult to manage for wildland fire.”37 The
primary challenge is that homes interspersed in dry wildland require an
“immediate and intense firefighter involvement—letting fire pursue its
natural course in a wooded residential area is not a feasible option.” 38
Another major challenge in intermix WUI is the general community
resistance to government regulation.39 The distaste for regulation on private
property in most of the intermix West creates “an exercise in frustration”
for wildland fire agencies, because building codes are “frequently
inadequate or disregarded despite dramatic losses and spectacular fires.”40
2.

Interface

Interface WUI development “exists where structures directly abut
wildland fuels . . . , [and] there is a clear line of demarcation” between

high vegetation cover, support[ing] previous findings . . . [of] [h]igher losses in rural
intermix environments.”). But see Heather A. Kramer et al., High Wildfire Damage in
Interface Communities in California, 28 INT’L J. WILDLAND FIRE 641, 641 (2019) (finding
that interface WUI contained fifty percent of buildings destroyed by wildfire in California
from 1985-2013 whereas intermix only contained thirty-two percent of building loss). “In
total, half of all buildings destroyed by wildfire were located in the interface WUI, which
composed only 2% of the area burned by these wildfires (though interface WUI includes
27% of all homes in California)”. Id. at 646.
33. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 32, at 642 (“[M]aintaining defensible space and
reducing fuel loads over large landscapes may be more effective in reducing wildfire losses
in the intermix WUI than the interface WUI.”). Kramer also notes that “fuel models and
wildland fire behaviour models” do not sufficiently account for “non-natural fuel such as
propane tanks, vehicles and the homes themselves” commonly found in interface WUI. Id.
34. See Urban Wildland Interface Communities, supra note 29, at 753.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Kramer et al., supra note 32, at 642.
38. Lauren Wishnie, Fire and Federalism, 17 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 1006, 1036 (2008).
39. CAROL L. RICE & JAMES B. DAVIS, U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S.D.A., GEN. TECH.
REP., PSW-127, LAND-USE PLANNING MAY REDUCE FIRE DAMAGE IN THE URBANWILDLAND INTERMIX 1 (1991).
40. Id.
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structures and wildland fuels.41 Interface areas typically have 250 or more
people per square mile, three or more structures per acre, and share
municipal services.42 These communities often have local government fire
protection to fight local outbreaks and advancing wildfire.
Although interface terrain comprises a smaller total of western WUI
than its counterparts, it accounts for a more significant portion of
suppression costs, structural damage, and death associated with wildfire. In
addition, because interface communities are dense clusters of settlement
abutting wildlands, the risk of human-caused wildfire is much more
significant.43
3.

Fire Response in the WUI

Wildfire response in WUI areas usually involves a coordinated
response using local, state, and federal fire response teams. The factor
determining initial response is typically the ignition point jurisdiction. 44
States respond to incidents on state land and private unincorporated areas,
and various federal agencies—including primarily USFS, but also Bureau
of Land Management, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and
Fish and Wildlife Service—may play some role in initial response.45 To
respond to fires affecting multiple jurisdictions, federal and state agencies
usually have cooperative agreements in place to assess initial response.46
The National Interagency Fire Center also assists state, local, and federal
agencies to coordinate joint response efforts and pool firefighting
resources.47

B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN WILDFIRE MANAGEMENT
The federal government will continue to play a prominent role in
wildfire management and suppression, because the federal government

41. See Urban Wildland Interface Communities, supra note 29, at 753.
42. See Urban Wildland Interface Communities, supra note 29, at 753.
43. Kramer et al., supra note 32, at 648. Increased population density leads to more
landscaping, agriculture, and structures that become sources of fuel themselves. Id.
44. Patrick Baylis & Judson Boomhower, Moral Hazard, Wildfires, and the
Economic Incidence of Natural Disasters 6 (NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH., Working Paper
No. 26550, 2019), https://perma.cc/24K6-GE7R.
45. Id.
46. KATIE HOOVER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10732, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR
WILDFIRE RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 1 (2020).
47. See How Resource Mobilization Works: Three Levels of Response, NAT’L
INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., https://perma.cc/2UAJ-Q97J (“National interagency coordination
is based on a three-tier system of response, including local, geographic area, and national.
There are almost 400 local dispatch centers across the nation, each of which coordinates the
initial and local response to a wildfire or other natural emergency.”).
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owns significant wildland acreage in the West.48 The federal government
also has the resources necessary to combat such a widespread and costly
problem.49 The federal government is responsible for addressing fires
ignited on federal lands and protects nonfederal lands under cooperative
agreements with states and localities.50 Forests on federal land are a
significant potential source for wildfire ignition,51 and wildfire on federal
land requires a multiagency response.52
The wildfire threat on federal land is due to the combined effects of
historic logging practices favoring larger, fire-resistant trees and federal fire
suppression policy in the twentieth century.53 As housing demand in the
West increased in the nineteenth and twentieth century, logging practices
favored mature tree species, which were historically resistant to forest
fire.54 Increased settlement and severe fire events in the early twentieth
48. CAROL HARDY VINCENT & LAURA A. HANSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42346,
FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 19 (2020). Of the roughly 640 million
federally owned acres, 45.9% of this acreage is in the eleven coterminous western states. Id.
49. To understand the growing cost of fire suppression for the federal government,
see KATIE HOOVER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46583, FEDERAL WILDFIRE MANAGEMENT: TENYEAR FUNDING TRENDS AND ISSUES (FY2011-FY2020), SUMMARY (2020) (“Total combined
FS and DOI wildfire appropriations fluctuated annually but increased from FY2011 to
FY2020. On average, combined wildfire appropriations were $4.48 billion annually in
inflation-adjusted constant FY2020 dollars, and the appropriations nearly doubled over the
10-year period. The FY2020 wildfire appropriation was $6.11 billion, the highest
appropriation to date.”).
50. Id. See also, e.g., CAL. WILDLAND FIRE COORDINATING AGENCY, 2018-2023
CALIFORNIA MASTER COOPERATIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT AND STAFFORD ACT
RESPONSE AGREEMENT (2018).
51. See Alan A. Ager et al., Wildfire Exposure to the Wildland Urban Interface in
the Western US, APPLIED GEOGRAPHY, Oct. 2019, at 1, 1 (“Simulated wildfires ignited on
national forests can potentially affect about half of the communities in the western US . . .
with 90% of exposure affecting the top 20% of the communities.”).
52. Federal agencies coordinate national fire response efforts through a partnership
with the National Interagency Fire Center. See Our Partners, NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE
CTR., https://perma.cc/3DD7-BG4W (“NIFC is home to the national fire management
programs for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, National Park Service, USDA Forest Service, along with partners
including the National Association of State Foresters, the U.S. Fire Administration, and the
National Weather Service.”).
53. ROSS GORTE, HEADWATERS ECON., THE RISING COST OF WILDFIRE PROTECTION 2
(2013). See generally Jack Cohen, The Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Problem, FOREST
HIST. TODAY, Fall 2008, at 20, 21 (“Wildfire exclusion started as a prime directive in the
early years of the U.S. Forest Service and became a broad national perspective.”).
54. Id. For a detailed discussion of how logging altered the species and age
distributions in California wildlands, see William F. Laudenslayer, Jr. & Herman H. Darr,
Historical Effects of Logging on the Forests of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Ranges of
California, 26 TRANSACTIONS W. SECTION WILDLIFE SOC’Y 12, 12 (1990) (“Because of their
value as lumber and the susceptibility of sugar pine to white pine blister rust… ponderosa
and sugar pine declined, and incense-cedar and California white fir increased over those
parts of the forest where they coexisted. At present, trees are, in general, younger and smaller
in diameter and height; however, occasional larger, older trees that were left after logging
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century forced the USFS to adopt the policy of complete fire suppression,55
leading to a buildup of natural fuel in wildland forests that have historically
experienced intermittent natural fires.56 Increased undergrowth, drier
conditions, and a rise in human activity on adjacent non-federal wildlands
have all contributed to the rise in wildfires started on federal land.57 Federal
wildland forests and WUI developments are often adjacent to large acres of
dry scrubland and grassland, which create an increased risk of acreage
spread.58
The federal government also supplies states with disaster aid and
emergency assistance grants at the time “‘a threat of major disaster
exists.’”59 States only shoulder 25% of these grant costs, so long as states
can show that a given fire event exceeds their threshold for fire cost.60 In
combination with other federal assistance with costs, state contributions to
wildfire activities often average “less than [0.5%]” of western state’s
general fund revenues.61 Moreover, these grant funds do not go to direct
firefighting response activities; rather, they go to activities that mitigate the
possibility of mudslides, debris flows, and future wildfire events.62 The
grants have a wide range of applicability, as they are accessible for fire
events on “publicly or privately owned forests or grasslands.”63
This continued federal assistance has created an entrenched
development problem known as the “guardianship model,” 64 where
residents in high-risk communities fail to organize or act locally under the

can still be found. Also, grasses have declined and higher amounts of shrubs and small trees
are now found under the tree canopy.”).
55. GORTE, supra note 53, at 2–3.
56. GORTE, supra note 53, at 2.
57. Jennifer K. Balch et al., Human-Started Wildfires Expand the Fire Niche Across
the United States, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 2946, 2947–48 (2017) (“Overall, humans
expand the spatial and temporal ‘fire niche’ by introducing ignitions into landscapes when
fuels are sufficiently dry enough to ignite and carry fire, but when lightning is rare.”).
58. Jessica R. Haas et al., A National Approach for Integrating Wildfire Simulation
Modeling into Wildland Urban Interface Risk Assessments Within the United States, 110
LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 44, 46 (2013). Research also indicates that wildfire spread
accounts for the majority of acreage burned, as opposed to localized ignitions. Id.
59. Fire Management Assistance Grants, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (last
updated July 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/ACP4-BBP4. See generally HOOVER, supra note 46
(discussing federal grant authorizations to assist wildfire response and recovery).
60. Id.
61. Philip S. Cook & Dennis R. Becker, UNIV. IDAHO, COLL. NAT. RES., POL’Y
ANALYSIS GRP., REP. NO. 37. STATE FUNDING FOR WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION IN THE WESTERN
U.S., at i, i (2017).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(f).
63. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 59.
64. Jesse B. Abrams et al., Re-Envisioning Community-Wildfire Relations in the U.S.
West as Adaptive Governance, 20 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, June 2015, at 1, 4 (quotation omitted).
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assumption that the federal government will suppress a fire.65 Although
wildfire events substantially affect municipal budgets,66 local governments
do not shoulder the majority of costs of short-term wildfire suppression and
associated externalities.67 As a result, investment in risk mitigation
measures is less likely,68 which may lead to decreased risk perception
among residents.69 Further, this guardianship model leads to a reactive and
inefficient local response that only seeks fire-adaptation following
destructive events.70

C. GROWTH TRENDS AND THE DECENTRALIZATION OF URBAN
AREAS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES SINCE 1990
WUI settlement is proliferating, regardless of whether citizens
recognize the growing risk of wildfire and increasingly dry weather.
Twenty-five million more individuals relocated to WUI areas from 1990 to
2010 and constructed 12.7 million additional housing units.71 The WUI area
development during this time period covered about 9.5% of the contiguous
United States, approximately the size of Washington State.72

65. Bruce E. Goldstein, Skunkworks in the Embers of the Cedar Fire: Enhancing
Resilience in the Aftermath of a Disaster, 36 HUM. ECOLOGY 15, 24 (Feb. 2007) (arguing
that government’s reassurance to the public of proper wildfire suppression created a
populace “complacent about fire risks, disengaged from any sense of responsibility for their
lives or environment, ignorant about ecological relationships and the practical skills needed
to protect their lives and property.”). Id. According to Goldstein, this tactic allowed federal,
state, and local governments to continue maintaining authority and legitimacy without
having to place “politically hazardous restrictions on the use of private property.” Id.
66. Yanjun Liao & Carolyn Kousky, The Fiscal Impacts of Wildfires on California
Municipalities 1 (Wharton Sch., Univ. Penn. Working Paper Series, 2020) (last revised Feb.
27, 2021). See also HEADWATERS ECON., THE FULL COMMUNITY COSTS OF WILDFIRE i
(2018). Suppression costs shouldered by state and federal agencies account for only nine
percent of wildfire cost, while costs from short-term expenses and long-term damages
account for the rest (shouldered by federal, state, and local entities)). Id. at 3. Short-term
expenses include “relief aid, evacuation services, and home and property loss.” Id. at 21–
27. Long-term damages include “tax, business, and natural resource loss; long-term
landscape rehabilitation; energy and infrastructure; human casualties; and degraded
ecosystem services.”
67. HEADWATERS ECON., supra note 66, at 33. Externalities include “smoke, habitat
destruction, carbon emissions, and increased risk of landslides.” Id.
68. Id.
69. For a broader discussion of the variance in WUI resident risk perception, see
infra Part I(c).
70. See Sarah E. Anderson et al., The Dangers of Disaster-Driven Responses to
Climate Change, 8 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 651, 651 (2018) (arguing that “Low-probability,
high-consequence climate change events are likely to trigger management responses that are
based on the demand for immediate action from those affected. . . . [T[hese responses may
be inefficient and even maladaptive in the long term.”).
71. Radeloff et al., supra note 5.
72. Id.
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Growth also trends toward WUI areas because the region provides
natural beauty, open space, and privacy.73 Many people prefer to live in
spacious, natural settings if their economic situation and job proximity
allow this lifestyle. Many urban job centers exist at the edge of significant
wildland acreage in the West.74 The availability of these decentralized
residential areas leads individuals to develop and settle in WUI settings
without regard for the broader wildfire risk. Additional suburban and
exurban WUI areas also have ample space and housing availability in
contrast to the West’s denser and expensive city centers.75
Property owners in the WUI also have a strong attachment to their “lot
and their lifestyle” and face the most substantial incentive to rebuild and
return to normalcy following a wildfire event.76 Even facing evidence that
their homes are at risk for future wildfire destruction, homeowners in the
WUI place more importance on “non-ecological” factors in their decision
to rebuild.77 Such factors include ties to the community and land, continued
availability of insurance and rebuilding assistance, and personal
experiences with wildfire events.78 Although recent studies agree that
residential increase of risk perception positively influences mitigation
activity,79 some have nonetheless found that “direct experience with

73. Evan Hjerpe et al., Forest Density Preferences of Homebuyers in the WildlandUrban Interface, 70 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 56, 56–57 (2016). Hjerpe also notes that these
benefits, derived mainly from large tree cover, make it hard for policymakers to engage
property owners about the parallel wildfire risks large, dense tree cover creates. Id.
74. The American West is surprisingly the most urban region of the United States;
California is the most urbanized state in the U.S., and Arizona, Nevada, and Utah all make
the top ten. Henry Grabar, Can We Design California Houses So They Don’t Burn?, SLATE
(Nov. 26, 2018, 10:47 AM),Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
https://perma.cc/3SUQ-B664. WUI housing growth trends also show that more Americans
are migrating into natural areas of the West. Id.
75. For a discussion of exurban settlement patterns, see Jill K. Clark et al., Spatial
characteristics of exurban settlement pattern in the United States, 90 LANDSCAPE & URB.
PLAN. 178, 179 (“Most commonly, exurbia is conceptualized as a place of transition between
urban and rural, located somewhere between the suburbs and truly rural areas and within the
commuting zone of a large, urbanized area.”).
76. Patricia M. Alexandre et al., Rebuilding and New Housing Development After
Wildfire, 24 INT’L J. WILDLAND FIRE 138, 139 (2015).
77. Id. at 146.
78. Alexandre et al., supra note 76, at 146.
79. See Benjamin Ghasemi et al., An Examination of the Social-Psychological
Drivers of Homeowner Wildfire Mitigation, 70 J. ENV’T PSYCH. 101442, 101447 (2020)
(“Similar to findings previously reported in the literature. . . we observed that perceived risk
of wildfire positively influences homeowners’ intention to adopt Firewise activities.”).
Firewise USA is a recognition program created by the National Fire Protection Association
where volunteers can undertake risk mitigation steps to receive a certification renewable
annually. Fire Causes and Risks, NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N (May 10, 2021),
https://perma.cc/4AHF-34AW. For example, USAA provides insurance discounts for
homeowners who receive FIREWISE certification in ten states. Insurance Discounts for
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wildfires did not significantly influence homeowners’ decisions to mitigate
the risk.”80 Further, there is often a large gap in risk perception between
WUI residents and the professionals that manage fire.81
Additionally, local government forces may drive development into
further wildlands. Many WUI communities are small towns or cities
incorporated separately from nearby urban counterparts and rely on local
tax revenue to provide infrastructure and municipal services to their
communities. Alongside these suburban, exurban, and rural communities
also exist unincorporated WUI communities subject to county jurisdiction.
Together, these smaller localities might face a general resistance to
dedicating public resources toward fire mitigation efforts.82 For larger cities
with incorporated WUI settlements, the combined prospect of revenue from
large housing developments and the need for affordable housing compel
the government to support projects in WUI.83 Wildfire is not often a
deterrent to these endeavors because most firefighting and protection costs
fall on federal and state taxpayers. This lack of deterrent creates the
possibility for a cycle of destruction in certain areas and draws attention to
the vital role local government plays in WUI development.84

PART II: DIMINISHING RETURNS: THE PROPERTY
INSURANCE PROBLEM IN WUI

USAA Members in 10 States, NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N (May 10, 2021),
https://perma.cc/Y7U8-LMC7.
80. See Wade E. Martin et al., The Role of Risk Perceptions in the Risk Mitigation
Process: The Case of Wildfire in High Risk Communities, 91 J. ENV’T MGMT. 489, 497
(2009).
81. See James R. Meldrum et al., Understanding Gaps Between the Risk Perceptions
of Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Residents and Wildfire Professionals, 35 RISK
ANALYSIS 1746, 1758 (2015) (finding that “this gap extends to many individual property
attributes related to wildfire risk, including the flammability of the home’s exterior and deck,
the distance to flammable vegetation and other combustibles, and the visibility of the
property’s address”). However, WUI residents tended to place “width of driveway” and
“level of background fields” in riskier categories than the professional counterpart. Id.
82. See Carroll et al., supra note 10 (remarking that rural lifestyle WUI communities
and working landscape/resource dependent WUI communities are generally less likely to
rely on public agency programs for fire prevention efforts).
83. See GREGORY L. SIMON, FLAME AND FORTUNE IN THE AMERICAN WEST: URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, AND THE GREAT OAKLAND HILLS FIRE 71–88
(2016) (providing a history of Oakland, California and the surrounding area’s relationship
with tax revenue and WUI development).
84. Many sources use this phrase to describe rebuilding issues in high-risk wildland
areas. See, e.g., Sean Kennedy & Stephanie Pincetl, Cal. Ctr. Sustainable Cmtys., Inst. Env’t
Sustainability, UCLA, ASLA 2018 Annual Meeting & Expo: Political and Economic
Drivers of Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Development in California 16 (Oct. 20, 2018),
https://perma.cc/SH7E-HGHB.
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This continued cycle of destruction is not sustainable for the private
property insurance market as wildfire frequency and severity rises. The
number of payouts from wildfire loss in western states has continued to
increase significantly in recent years.85 This loss forecast is forcing
insurance companies to reconsider their options in western states acutely
affected by wildfire.86

A. NON-RENEWALS AND RATE INCREASES
Property insurance companies in the West are now facing
consequences from longstanding sales of artificially low premiums in fireprone wildland areas. Property insurance is a necessity for any homeowner
seeking a mortgage,87 and its broader role in encouraging stable property
ownership prompts close government regulation to ensure that citizens can
access affordable premiums.88 For years, insurance companies offered
comprehensive home insurance policies in WUI communities that were
indirectly subsidized by federal and state firefighting management services
that suppress fires and provide disaster recovery assistance to affected
communities.89 National insurance companies also issued these

85. RMS Says Insured Losses from 2020 Western U.S. Wildfires $7-$13 Billion, INS.
J. (Dec. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/6X65-9F7A.
86. Id. (noting that 2020 loss estimates were highest in Northern California ($5-$9
billion), Oregon and Washington ($1-$3 billion), and Colorado (up to $1 billion)).
California, Oregon, and Colorado all experienced record-breaking fires in 2020. Id. See
Samantha Fields, Insurance Increasingly Unaffordable as Climate Change Brings More
Disasters, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/7EZA-3R6F.
87. See MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: CONSUMER DEMAND,
MARKETS AND REGULATION 83 (2003) (“[H]omeowners insurance . . . is essentially
mandatory . . . .”).
88. Christopher French, America on Fire: Climate Change, Wildfires & Insuring
Natural Catastrophes, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 817, 851 (2020) (finding that the insurance
industry is highly regulated because it is a mandatory requirement in certain purchases with
one-sided bargaining power, possesses an anticompetitive nature, requires assurance of its
promise to the consumer through a guaranty or reinsurance, and entails a public policy
concern for compensation of innocent victims).
89. See SIMON, supra note 83, at 83 (“Moreover beyond the insurance industry stands
a large federal system of fire mitigation services that reduces insurance company cost-share
responsibilities, leading in turn to artificially low coverage plans for homeowners. If
residents can afford the cost of comprehensive fire insurance—such as guaranteed
replacement cost plans—they can effectively pay for the right to live in areas with
historically high fire activity.”). See also Paulo Issler et al., Mortgage Markets with
Climate-Change Risk: Evidence from Wildfires in California 1 (U.C. Berkeley, Haas Sch.
Bus., Fisher Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Econ. Working Paper, 2020) (“This development
is encouraged by the fact that firefighting in the forests and grasslands of the western US is
the responsibility of state or federal agencies, and not of either homeowners or local
decision-makers such as cities and counties.”).
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undervalued WUI rates due to a combination of relatively low fire
incidence and a broad, varying risk pool across the country.90
This system of private insurance coverage is breaking down. Private
insurers are increasingly reluctant to offer affordable coverage in western
WUI communities.91 In California, they are refusing to renew policies or
denying coverage to high-risk WUI properties.92 In a place like California,
with government caps on property insurance rate increases,93 non-renewal
by insurers in the ten most fire-exposed counties increased 203% from 2018
to 2019 before state government intervened and placed a moratorium on
non-renewals.94 In Colorado, homeowners’ insurance rates increased 15%
in 2013 due to multiple wildfires and prompted the state to pass a reform
act that eased the burden of rising rates and “tighte[ned]” underwriting
standards.95
Recent wildfire events in the West are forcing public officials to
“grappl[e] with how to reform these markets to provide adequate coverage
to homeowners while remaining solvent.”96 The increased timeframe,
scale, and length of wildfires in recent years demonstrate that a single
disaster event can threaten an insurance company’s solvency.97 As a result,
private insurance companies with pools of high-risk customers in the West
may not renew these policies or risk pricing their customers out of the

90. INS. INFOR. INST., supra note 1 (“Annual Number of Acres Burned in Wildland
Fires, 1980-2020”).
91. See Alicja Grzadkowska, Property Market Under Stress as Insurers Have
“Dramatically Withdrawn” Due to Wildfires, INS. BUS. AM. (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://perma.cc/W6AM-7F83 (“Many of the standard lines companies are non-renewing
any property that has a score in excess of six in the fire protection class system, and are often
excluding properties that have an even lower score than that.”).
92. See infra Part II(b).
93. CAL. DEP’T INS., DATA ON INSURANCE NON-RENEWALS, FAIR PLAN, AND
SURPLUS LINES (2015-2019) 1–3 (2020). Non-renewals statewide increased by thirty-one
percent from 2018 to 2019 (179,479 homes to 235,274 homes). Id. at 1. Modeling
projections show that sixty-five percent of homes in Tuolumne, Trinity, Nevada, Mariposa,
Plumas, Alpine, Calaveras, Sierra, Amador, and El Dorado counties are in “high fire risk
fire exposure” area. Id. at 4 n.2.
94. John Egan & Amy Danise, What’s California Going To Do About Future
Wildfire Insurance?, FORBES ADVISOR (Sept. 21, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/NW6HBRZF. From 2010 to 2017, California homeowners’ insurance premiums increased only
7.3%. Id.
95. HEADWATERS ECON., DOES INSURANCE INFLUENCE HOME BUILDING ON FIREPRONE LANDS? 5 (2016).
96. Katherine R. H. Wagner, Why Is Reforming Natural Disaster Insurance Markets
So Hard, STAN. INST. ECON. POL’Y RSCH., 2 (2020).
97. LLOYD DIXON ET AL., supra note 12, at 50 (“Underwriting profits in the
Homeowners Multiple Peril and Fire lines totaled $12.1 billion from 2001 through 2016
combined, and were almost completely wiped out by the results for 2017.”).
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market.98 In California, insurance companies even deny coverage to firehardened properties in high-risk areas.99 These trends indicate an increasing
likelihood that private insurers will begin to approach wildfire risk as a
correlated loss like flooding, refusing to cover damage in the future and
creating a devastating financial risk for WUI residents.100

B. STATE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
State governments have started to respond with measures to mitigate
the harsh effects of rate increases and policy non-renewals facing WUI
citizens. For example, state governments, rather than Congress, regulate the
insurance industry as a matter of “the public interest.” 101 California
provides the most prominent example of government intervention,102
because it contains a significantly higher proportion of homes in the WUI
compared to other western states.103
For example, California Insurance Commissioner Ricardo Lara
renewed an existing moratorium in November 2020 on residential property
non-renewals and shielded nearly 2.1 million properties (18% of the state’s
residential insurance market) from possible non-renewal.104 The California
Senate also rejected AB 2167 in 2020, a bill that would have allowed
insurance companies to sidestep rate increase restrictions for homes that
face high wildfire risk.105 The bill faced significant consumer opposition, 106
despite industry proponents claiming it was necessary to continue offering
98. SIMON, supra note 83, at 45 (estimating that “900,000 residential properties are
currently located in high or very high wildfire-risk categories (as designated by state and
federal fire zone severity mapping projects)”).
99. James Bikales, Can ‘Fire Hardening’ Solve California’s Home Insurance
Crisis?, CAL MATTERS (Dec. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/CN2B-M74H.
100. See French, supra note 88, at 824–25 (“Because many types of natural
catastrophes are considered correlated risks, private insurers generally refuse to insure them.
Private insurers avoid insuring correlated risks because of insurers’ alleged inability to
accurately predict when and where losses associated with correlated risks will occur, which
in turn makes it difficult to establish actuarially sound premiums and spread the risk across
a large enough pool of insureds with diverse risk profiles.”) (citation omitted).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2020).
102. Nonetheless, Colorado also prohibits non-renewal of properties that faced
wildfire risk in a federally designated disaster area. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-110.9(2)
(2021).
103. Verisk Wildfire Risk Analysis, VERISK, https://perma.cc/95LL-AKAV.
California has 2,040,600 properties at high to extreme fire risk; Colorado, the next highest
western state, has only 373,900 properties at high or extreme fire risk. Id.
104. See Press Release, Ricardo Lara, Cal. Dep’t Ins., Insurance Commissioner Lara
Projects More Than 2 Million Policyholders Affected by Wildfires from Policy NonRenewal for One Year (Nov. 5, 2020) (on file with U.C. Hastings Law Library).
105. Assem. Bill No. 2167 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).
106. See e.g., Ricardo Lara & Richard Holober, ‘I’ve Had More Stress than I’ve Ever
Felt’: AB 2167 Is Detrimental to Many Californians, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 10, 2020, 7:31
AM), https://perma.cc/Z8WU-ZVGW.
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coverage in the state’s highest-risk areas.107 However, drastic measures like
moratoriums on private insurance non-renewals are not sustainable, as
these areas continue to grow and develop. For state FAIR plans, private
sponsors and state legislatures will likely grow dissatisfied with the
growing burden of the insurance program’s strain on revenue. Insurers
forced to continue insuring high-risk policies and set rate increases within
state approval will likely contemplate exiting the state market entirely.

C. FAIR PLAN ASSOCIATIONS
To alleviate the burden of policy non-renewals and rate increases,
California and other western states cover wildfire damage under their FAIR
plans for customers who need last resort property insurance.108 They are
typically subsidized by state taxpayers and a pool of the authorized insurers
in the state who collectively cover the high risk.109 For example, the
California FAIR plan offers a skeleton property insurance plan that covers
damage to a dwelling and belongings for fire or lightning, smoke, and
internal explosions.110 However, the plan does not cover any other
“physical loss” except for optional “extended coverage” and vandalism
coverage.111 FAIR plan reliance has grown significantly in California in the
past three years, and the program paid over $350 million claims between
September and December 2020 alone.112
Reactive state government intervention and overreliance on FAIR
plans are not sustainable solutions for the growing number of WUI
residents facing non-renewals and unaffordable property insurance rates.
Policy measures that force insurers to provide affordable coverage in highrisk areas will have greater incentive for insurers to exit markets entirely to
avoid costly losses with each fire season. In the long term, this exit will
disproportionately affect middle class and lower-income WUI residents

107. See e.g., Don Jergler, California Bill Addressing Property Rates in WildfireProne Areas Awaits Hearing, INS. J. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/2XTP-D796 (“The
bill calls for ensuring insurance rates are adequate to avoid insurer insolvencies and to
permit insurers to operate in the state’s highest risk areas. . . . The bill’s language makes the
argument that climate change has created a ‘new reality’ in California, where the average
length of fire seasons are 80 days longer than in the 1970s, and that major insurers are pulling
back from writing new policies or renewing policies in the wildland-urban interface fire
areas.” (quote omitted)).
108. See, e.g., Bethan Moorcraft, What Are FAIR Insurance Plans?, INS. BUS. MAG.
(July 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/2VJM-XNPK.
109. Id.
110. See e.g., CAL. FAIR PLAN ASS’N, INSURANCE POLICY COMPARISON CFP
DWELLING POLICY TO ISO HO-3, https://perma.cc/84AD-N62T.
111. Id. Extended coverage includes windstorms, hail, explosions, riots, aircrafts,
and vehicles.
112. Dawn Hodson, FAIR Plan Rates To Rise, MOUNTAIN DEMOCRAT (Dec. 11,
2020, 3:59 PM), https://perma.cc/L5DU-5HZ9.
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who cannot afford surplus line insurance and instead have only the option
to underinsure their homes through a FAIR plan.113

PART III: NFIP AS A MODEL FOR WHAT TO DO AND
WHAT NOT TO DO FOR A FEDERAL WILDFIRE
INSURANCE PROGRAM
To address the growing property insurance problem in WUI
communities, Congress should use the NFIP as both a model and a
cautionary tale for providing insurance in high-risk areas. The United States
has already faced a similar non-renewal and rate increase problem.
Properties in high-risk flood areas after losses from the 1927 Mississippi
River floods led private insurers to exit the market.114 “In the absence of
private insurance,” the federal government provided aid “in the form of
flood disaster relief,” while congressional efforts to address the insurance
problem stalled.115 As development continued in floodplain areas and
disaster costs ballooned, the government sought a method of pooling risk
to sustain inevitable recovery efforts.116 Congress also realized that local
government and property owner participation were vital to mitigating
future flood risk in areas prone to repeated disaster events.117 Legislators
passed the NFIP in 1968 to provide flood insurance to individuals in highrisk flood areas and impose building and zoning strategies that mitigate
future losses.118
Today, the program insures over 5 million households and
businesses.119 However, the NFIP also suffers from crippling debt,120 low
consumer participation,121 scant enforcement of flood mitigation

113.
114.

See infra Part VI(c).
NAT’L ACADS. PRESS, AFFORDABILITY OF NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM PREMIUMS: REPORT 1, at 23-24 (2015).
115. Id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a).
117. See id. § 4002(b)(3).
118. CONG. RSCH. SERV., REP. NO. R44593, INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP) 2 (2021) [hereinafter NFIP REPORT].
119. H.R. 3167, 116th Cong. § 2(4) (2019).
120. NFIP REPORT, supra note 118, at 27. Similar to the worsening wildfire crisis in
the West, hurricane frequency and severity continues to worsen for the southern and eastern
United States. Id. These areas witnessed an expeditious rise in severe hurricane events over
the past twenty years that brought the NFIP’s debt to $20.525 billion (with only $9.9 billion
remaining borrowing authority). Id. This figure does not include the $16 billion in debt
Congress cancelled to pay for the 2017 hurricane season. Id. For perspective, the NFIP was
able to cover its own costs prior to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, requiring only small loans
from the U.S. treasury repaid with interest. Id.
121. French, supra note 88, at 866–67.
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measures,122 outdated mapping of flood zone areas,123 SRLs that collect
multiple damage claims,124 overlapping federal spending on disaster
recovery,125 and harsh political pushback against measures to increase
premiums that reflect accurate flood risk.126 Climate change also increases
the frequency of extreme weather events in high-risk areas.127 The program
requires major reform to maintain an operation that is not sinking further
into debt following each (increasingly frequent, severe) natural disaster.
However, both political sides agree on the program’s necessity to affected
communities and citizens.128 To develop a functional wildfire insurance
program, Congress should examine the structure of the NFIP to determine
what areas of the program work best in the context of wildfire.

A. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
The NFIP’s community participation model provides a useful tool to
dictate land use and zoning controls. In the NFIP, states or localities that
agree to participate must show a “positive interest in securing flood
insurance coverage” and agree to implement land use and construction laws
to mitigate future flood risk.129 In addition, communities may participate in
a “community rating system” that provides incentives for localities to
122. Adelle Thomas & Robin Leichenko, Adaptation Through Insurance: Lessons
from the NFIP, 3 INT’L J. CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 255 (2011) (arguing that
enforcement of flood mitigation ordinances currently falls primarily on lenders backing a
given property’s mortgage).
123. NFIP REPORT, supra note 118, at 4 (“Flood maps adopted across the country
vary considerably in age and in quality. While some FIRMs may have last been developed
and adopted by a community in the 1980s, especially in rural areas of the country, most
communities will have maps adopted within the past 15 to 20 years.”).
124. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. ASS’N, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NFIP 35
(2011).
125. Thomas & Leichenko, supra note 122, at 252.
126. See generally Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act, Pub. L. No. 11389, 128 Stat. 1020, 1020 (2014) (“An Act [t]o delay the implementation of certain provisions
of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Act of 2012, and for other purposes.”). Provisions of
the Act include “repeal of certain rate increases . . . , restoration of grandfathered rates. . . ,”
and other relaxations of the 2012 reform. Id. at §§ 3–4.
127. William V. Sweet et al., Sea Level Rise, in CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT:
FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, Vol. I, at 334 (D.J. Wuebbles et al. eds., U.S.
Global
Change
Research
Program
2017),
https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf (“Assuming
storm characteristics do not change, sea level rise will increase the frequency and extent of
extreme flooding associated with coastal storms, such as hurricanes and nor’easters (very
high confidence).”).
128. Michelle Cottle, Can Congress Bring the National Flood Insurance Program
Above Water?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/GSF5-FRW8 (“Despite the
bipartisan nature of NFIP, the regional politics involved make significant change next to
impossible.”).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c). See also id. § 4102 (providing the Administrator guidelines
to craft land use and construction laws).
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implement these land use controls.130 Communities may receive “credits”
based on the amount of flood and erosion damage risk they reduce that
apply to their residents’ insurance premiums.131

B. MANDATORY PURCHASE REQUIREMENT
The NFIP surveys participating communities and determines which
areas are within a Special Flood Hazard Area (“SFHA”).132 Properties
located within an SFHA are subject to a mandatory purchase requirement,
meaning that the owner must obtain flood insurance for any home financed
using a mortgage from a federally backed lender or government-sponsored
enterprise.133 Although federal mortgage regulators responsible for this
requirement do not provide official statistics,134 studies indicate that
compliance with the requirement varies depending on the region of the
United States.135 The most recent amendment to increase enforcement
requires regulated lenders to escrow flood insurance for mortgages, subject
to exceptions.136 Although this requirement went into effect in 2016, no
data exists to show whether the program successfully increased
compliance.137

C. THE NEW RISK RATING 2.0 TO CALCULATE PREMIUMS
The NFIP is also implementing a new system to calculate flood
insurance rates in participating communities. Known as Risk Rating 2.0,
this process will use a combination of catastrophe models, existing NFIP
mapping data, and other “cutting-edge technology” to provide a more
accurate risk calculation at the national and local levels.138 Instead of
assigning premium rates to a structure based on its location within a given
flood zone, the new risk scheme will assess individual property
characteristics and susceptibility to flood. 139 Although Risk Rating 2.0 also
130. 42 U.S.C. § 4022(b). For an overview of community rating system eligibility,
see generally FEMA, NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL Appx. F (2021).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 4022(b).
132. CONG. RSCH. SERV., REP. NO., R45999, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: THE CURRENT RATING STRUCTURE AND RISK RATING 2.0, at 3 (2019) [hereinafter
RISK RATING 2.0 REPORT].
133. RISK RATING 2.0 REPORT, supra note 132.; FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. ASS’N,
FLOOD ZONES, https://perma.cc/DR44-X26R (last updated July 8, 2020) (further
subdividing SFHAs into multiple subzones depending on floodplain characteristics).
134. NFIP REPORT, supra note 118, at 11.
135. Id. (finding that compliance may be as high as 88% in the west and as low as
43% in the Midwest). A 2017 study found that New York City flood insurance rates
increased from 61% in 2012 to 73% in 2016, likely in response to Hurricane Sandy. Id.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(d)(1).
137. NFIP REPORT, supra note 118, at 12.
138. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. ASS’N, RISK RATING 2.0: EQUITY IN ACTION,
https://perma.cc/G8FN-XEXW (last updated Feb. 13, 2022).
139. RISK RATING 2.0 REPORT, supra note 132, at 7–10.
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plans to offer subsidy credits for individual homeowner property actions
that mitigate flood risk, the program structure intends to phase out
insurance subsidies to better reflect actual risk.140 Federal Emergency
Management Agency (“FEMA”) plans to implement this risk strategy to
create “transparent and accurate flood insurance pricing” that will lead to
better “risk communication and an increase in flood insurance take-up
rate.”141 However, FEMA also stresses that this restructuring is not
“designed to increase or decrease revenue for the NFIP.” 142 Nonetheless,
individually assessed flood insurance rates should lead to more accurate
risk distribution for homes within SFHAs.

D. PROBLEMS WITH SEVERE REPETITIVE LOSS PROPERTIES
A major problem for the NFIP in recent decades involves SRL
properties, properties that are “repeatedly flooded, repaired, and rebuilt.”143
This small number of properties are responsible for a disproportionate
number of damage claims paid by the program.144 To resolve the problem,
Congress created the SRL category to distinguish these properties and
reassign them to a “Special Direct Facility” that monitors them and issues
higher premium rates.145 Additionally, recent reform to recoup losses from
SRL properties requires their owners to pay a 15% additional premium on
the annual flood insurance rate.146 The program allows individuals to
undertake flood mitigation activities on the property and apply for removal
from SRL status for the next annual rate calculation.147 One primary
concern for homeowners and FEMA alike is the potential for many homes
to meet SRL status as climate change leads to rising sea levels and
increasingly severe storms.148 Additionally, not all participating NFIP

140. Id. at 13.
141. Id. at 16.
142. Id. at 7–9 (stating that insurance premiums are calculated based on risk
modeling, geographic and structural variables, and replacement cost value).
143. DENA ALDER & JOEL SCATA, COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
L., BREAKING THE CYCLE OF “FLOOD-REBUILD-REPEAT”: LOCAL AND STATE OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE AND IMPROVEMENT STANDARDS IN THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM i (2019).
144. Id. at 2 (“The NFIP paid $5.5 billion to repair and rebuild more than 30,000
SRL properties between 1978 and 2015. These SRL properties constitute only 0.6 percent
of the 5.1 million properties insured through the NFIP but have consumed a disproportionate
9.6 percent of all damages paid out of the NFIP as of 2015.”) (citations omitted).
145. FEMA, NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL I-1 (2021).
146. RISK RATING 2.0 REPORT, supra note 132, at 7.
147. Id. at 9–10.
148. See ALDER & SCATA, supra note 143, at 4 (“Sea level rise will further exacerbate
the cycle of ‘flood-rebuild-repeat’ plaguing the NFIP. NRDC estimates that 3 feet of sea
level rise by 2100 could result in an additional 820,000 severe repetitive loss (SRL)
properties and 6 feet of SLR would result in 2.57 million more SRL properties.”) (citation
omitted).
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communities have or enforce a “repetitive loss provision” that records,
declares, and mandates improvements to properties that have experienced
repetitive loss.149
Although the NFIP suffers from fundamental problems that led to its
burdensome debt, the NFIP nonetheless provides a viable basis to construct
a functioning national insurance program for a disaster like wildfire that
insurers are treating with skepticism and concern.

PART IV: LITERATURE DISCUSSING A NATIONAL
WILDFIRE INSURANCE PROGRAM
There is existing literature discussing variations of a national wildfire
insurance program. Attorney Benjamin Reilly advocates for a program that
imposes an individual mandate penalty on individuals who live in
qualifying WUI areas but refuse to participate in the program.150 His
program would preempt private wildfire insurance options to ensure a large
coverage pool and charge rates that accurately reflect the risk of living in
WUI communities. Professor Christopher French advocates for a national
catastrophe insurance program that combines insurance for floods, fires,
hurricanes, landslides, and other disaster events into a single policy to
create a larger risk pool.151

A. USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTHCARE MANDATE PAYMENT
MODEL TO ENFORCE PURCHASE OF WILDFIRE INSURANCE
THAT REFLECTS ACTUAL RISK
Reilly advocates for a NWIP that acts as sole provider of wildfire
insurance in the country.152 Under his proposal for the NWIP, the federal
government should adjust the cost of wildfire insurance to reflect the actual
risk of living in wildfire-prone areas.153 For property owners that refuse to
purchase wildfire insurance, Reilly proposes a “homeowner mandate” that
places a tax penalty on homeowners who fail to purchase wildfire insurance
from the federal government.154 To support the legality of this mandate,
Reilly cites the Supreme Court’s opinion in National Federation of
149. NFIP REPORT, supra note 118, at 13.
150. Benjamin S. Reilly, Free Riders on the Firestorm: How Shifting the Costs of
Wildfire Management to Residents of the Wildland-Urban Interface Will Benefit Our Public
Forests, 42 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 541, 562 (2015).
151. French, supra note 88, at 850. In addition to the solutions that Reilly and French
pose, Headwaters Economics mentions a National Wildfire Insurance Program. GORTE,
supra note 53, at 13.
152. Reilly, supra note 150, at 543.
153. Id. at 543 n.16 (“For purposes of this Note, ‘actual wildfire risk’ accounts for
the suppression costs incurred by the federal government.”).
154. Id. at 561 (explaining that this mandate serves a similar role to the NFIP’s
mandatory purchase requirement).
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Independent Business v. Sebelius,155 which held that a mandate penalizing
individuals who fail to purchase health insurance was a valid use of
congressional taxing power.156 Reilly also emphasizes the importance of
fire mitigation incentives to reduce premiums and the use of a phasing
system to lessen the burden of incremental rate increases.157
Reilly’s use of an individual mandate to enforce insurance purchase
would likely face poor political reception. Reilly notes that an individual
mandate to purchase wildfire insurance for WUI residents would create
immense political backlash.158 Echoing Reilly’s concern, Congress later
repealed the individual mandate requirement in 2018.159 Although
Congress may survive a Supreme Court challenge to legislation that
required a wildfire insurance mandate,160 it is unlikely that this enforcement
scheme would become law. Additionally, Reilly’s exclusion of private
insurers from the wildfire insurance market may prove unsound; if private
insurers begin to fashion policies to compete with NWIP rates that offer
mitigation subsidies, this will provide the dual benefit of consumer
affordability and fire-hardening on private land.

B. A NATIONAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE PROGRAM THAT
COVERS ALL NATURAL DISASTERS TO INCREASE THE
OVERALL RISK POOL
French argues that the federal government should create a bundled
National Catastrophe Insurance Program to provide natural disaster
insurance to property owners in high-risk areas through a single policy.161
French explains that standalone national insurance programs like the NFIP
are unsuccessful because they suffer from adverse selection, in which the
only individuals that participate in the program have the highest risk,

155. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588
(2012); see also Reilly, supra note 150, at 565–71.
156. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 572.
157. Reilly, supra note 150, at 562–64.
158. Id. at 564 (“This Note does not endeavor to explain why wildfire insurance
reform could be or would be more politically palatable than attempts to reform the NFIP or
the ACA.”).
159. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2092, 11081 (2017)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A); Since the repeal of the federal individual
healthcare mandate in 2018, only five states (CA, MA, NJ, RI, and VT) and the District of
Columbia have enacted their own health insurance requirement. Jennifer Tolbert et al., State
Actions To Improve the Affordability of Health Insurance in the Individual Market, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (July 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/8Q8R-6RFD.
160. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 588.
161. French, supra note 88, at 821 (“Specifically, this Article proposes that coverage
for natural catastrophe perils, including wildfires, floods, landslides, and hurricanes, be
‘bundled’ together in a single property insurance policy sold by the government.”) (footnote
omitted).
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creating a pool of high-risk insureds with no balance.162 This adverse
selection leads to high premium rates, which in turn lead to low take-up
rates for individuals that may face some degree of natural disaster risk. 163
French emphasizes that these adverse selection problems will lead to a
program like the NFIP that faces a large deficit, charges high premiums for
low coverage, and still fails to reflect the actual risk associated with the
property at issue.164
By creating a combined risk pool across the country’s natural
disasters, French argues that this approach will address the problems of
“correlated risk, adverse selection, and moral hazard” that arise when
private insurers refuse to cover these losses.165 He argues that the federal
government is best equipped to administer the program, because the federal
government “would allow for the pool of insureds to span the entire
country.”166 Although French disagrees with the viability of a standalone
program like the NWIP,167 he offers two compelling points that legislators
should consider if they choose to craft such a wildfire program:
1. A standalone NWIP program must emphasize the importance of
wildfire coverage to property owners across all of America’s
WUI,168 addressing the problem of adverse selection in standalone
programs by incorporating areas that face a lower (but realized) fire
risk. However, one obstacle to this approach is likely a low takeup rate, as individuals in the central and eastern WUI may view this
coverage as a scheme to bail out property owners who live in
increasingly wildfire-prone western regions.
2. The creation of government catastrophe insurance provides a
structured and predictable payout mechanism to victims of natural
disasters.169 This insurance would provide predictability for those
affected by natural disaster, increases transparency regarding the
use of federal disaster relief funding, and avoids the political
obstacles associated with a reactive bailout bill.170

162. Id. at 854.
163. Id. at 857 (noting that, in addition to unaffordable rates for flood insurance,
ignorance of the risk involved with a given property affects the program’s low take-up rate).
164. Id. at 856–57.
165. Id. at 822.
166. French, supra note 88, at 849 n.159.
167. Id. at 854.
168. See generally Brown et al., supra note 5.
169. French, supra note 88, at 853–54.
170. Id. at 854.
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French particularly argues that a bundled program will help solve the
problems that affect standalone programs like the NFIP: adverse selection,
high premiums, and low take up rates.171
However, these problems may persist regardless of insuring multiple
perils. Although the number of individuals under the plan may increase,
homeowner behavior would likely still exhibit low take-up rates, purchase
by those who only face severe risk, and resulting high premiums. Arguably,
a standalone program implemented based on land characteristics (like
WUI) and enforced in communities with varying degrees of risk could
better solve these problems by creating a more balanced risk pool.

PART V: A REIMAGINED NATIONAL WILDFIRE
INSURANCE PROGRAM—VOLUNTARY PROGRAM
FOR MUNICIPALITIES THAT AVOIDS THE
FAILURES OF NFIP AND TAKES A BROADER, MORE
AGGRESSIVE APPROACH TO FIRE PREVENTION
To address property insurance non-renewals due to wildfire, the
federal government should create a NWIP that establishes accurate risk
premiums for property in fire-prone WUI communities while also
providing strong incentives for property owners and localities to use their
land control power to mitigate this risk. This program will offer standalone
coverage for wildfire insurance. Private insurers may continue to provide
comprehensive property coverage or sever wildfire liability from the plan
and provide other property coverage.
This program recognizes the barriers to halting wildland development
and the large number of existing WUI communities already present in the
United States. Because of this entrenched attachment to WUI development,
this article advocates for a federal wildfire coverage program to spur fire
prevention investment at the state and local level, mitigate excess insurance
rate increases and non-renewals affecting WUI citizens, and over time
stabilize the federal fire suppression budget.

A. BROADER PROGRAM GOALS
1.

Offer to all municipalities

The federal government should offer the program to all WUI
municipalities in the country that express interest in wildfire mitigation.
Although the West faces the most acute risk from wildfire currently, other
WUI areas in the United States also experience destructive wildfire events
and forecast increases in annual fire activity over the next century.172 This
171.
172.

Id.
See Brown et al., supra note 5, at 2, 5–6.
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broad eligibility is also necessary to provide a large risk pool with varying
degrees of exposure.173
Given the considerable number of private acres that exist in the WUI,
this program will ideally spur investment at the state and local level in
broad-scale property and land use reforms. The increasing inability to
obtain property insurance will become a central issue for constituents in the
WUI and pressure local politicians to participate in NWIP. Although states
will continue to offer FAIR plan policies and regulate insurance rate
increases, these are not sustainable solutions to a growing volume of
uninsured or underinsured WUI properties. It is likely that private insurance
could pull out of these markets entirely if losses are too great for rates to
justify continued participation. Given that FAIR plans are either state
funded or subsidized by private insurance, a large increase in participants
may net the same effect, or else place the state in a perilous financial
situation during a season of severe fire disaster.
2.

Bolster private, local, and state participation in fire mitigation
and prevention

Given inherent state and local authority over land use issues, this
program will require the municipality to implement a scaled system of
building and zoning requirements in exchange for providing NWIP
coverage. It also compels private citizen engagement in land management
reform, as affordable wildfire insurance is a vital commodity in higher risk
WUI areas. Lastly, a long-term strategy emphasizing state, local, and
private mitigation efforts may eventually reduce the federal cost of wildfire
suppression and allow the USFS to focus its efforts on fire prevention.174
However, current trends in federal fire appropriations indicate that any sort
of cost-saving benefit from such a program is far off.
The NWIP should also implement a mandatory wildfire insurance
purchase requirement to spur purchase of wildfire insurance in participating
communities. For example, the NFIP requires individuals seeking federally
backed mortgage loans in high-risk floodplain areas to purchase flood
insurance. Similarly, the NWIP must implement a compulsory participation
mechanism to ensure that continued development in WUI communities
prioritizes fire mitigation from the outset of planning and construction.

173. French, supra note 88, at 857.
174. However, the program may still face the participation issue that burdens the
NFIP (individuals in areas with mild to moderate flood risk refuse to support municipal
participation). To combat this issue, the program must stress the cost savings associated with
severing wildfire risk from a general policy and the subsidies the NWIP offers to those who
take risk reduction measures.
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3.

Ensure residents can obtain subsidies in exchange for this
mitigation and prevention to afford wildfire insurance

To calculate rates, the NWIP should use the NFIP’s incoming Risk
Rating 2.0 model as a basis for its premium calculation,175 create subsidies
for individuals that enact land management reforms, enforce strict
condemnation and relocation measures for SRLs, construct a subsidy
program for low-income individuals in the WUI, and provide individuals
the opportunity for voluntary condemnation and relocation. However, the
program must take care to craft an accurate definition of an SRL for highrisk wildfire communities.
Although the program’s larger goal is to ensure that WUI residents
can continue accessing insurance, there may be some areas with such a
prohibitive fire-risk that affordable rates are unjustified. However, the
existence of fire-hardening subsidies, lower-income mitigation assistance
grants, and the option to voluntarily condemn and relocate will help offset
the burden of prohibitive rates for individuals in extremely high-risk areas.
4.

Stabilize the federal fire suppression budget

Although current wildfire trends forecast increasing budget
expenditures on federal fire suppression, the long-term goal of a program
like the NWIP is to implement preventative measures at the private, local,
and state level while undertaking similar steps on federal land. By creating
a cooperative structure that promotes standard fire-hardening practices at
all levels of wildland jurisdiction, the program should help facilitate more
predictable and containable wildfire seasons in the future.
5.

Allow private insurers to continue operation

Additionally, federal wildfire insurance coverage may allow private
insurers to continue offering coverage to property owners in NWIPparticipant areas for affordable rates because the risk of numerous claims
from wildfire damage will no longer threaten payout ability.176 By severing
wildfire protection from a basic homeowner insurance policy (but
maintaining coverage for fire losses unassociated with wildfire), insurers
will have less reason to leave western property insurance markets.
Although some may argue that this policy promotes continuing
175. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., REP. NO., R45999, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: THE CURRENT RATING STRUCTURE AND RISK RATING 2.0, at 1 (2022). The main
feature of Risk Rating 2.0 is the calculation of premiums using individual property
characteristics instead of broader zone characteristics; the program’s rate calculation change
began October 1, 2021. Id. Legislators crafting a premium program for NWIP will have the
opportunity to study the short-term consequences of Risk Rating 2.0 on the NFIP program
and anticipate problems in the wildfire insurance context.
176. See KOUSKY ET AL., supra note 23.
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development in wildfire-prone areas, this proposal recognizes that
mitigation and prevention are the most viable strategies to manage WUI
communities.
To create a successful NWIP structure, Congress must avoid program
measures that lead to unmanageable debt in the event of multiple
catastrophes. To do so, Congress must target the same issues that plagued
the NFIP by177:
•
•
•

reflecting actual risk in premiums;
mandating strict SRL requirements and possible condemnations;
utilizing risk and mapping tools that incorporate new wildfire
events and location data into existing maps of WUI community
risk;
creating a streamlined incentive program for property owners and
localities that offers grants to municipalities for community fire
mitigation activities;
creating subsidies for property owners who mitigate their personal
property risk; and
creating voluntary buyout options to individuals with repetitiveloss properties or who face a forecasted risk of repetitive loss.

•
•
•

The following sections of this article outline NWIP features that
Congress can utilize to craft a financially sound wildfire insurance
program.

B. HOW TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS
1.

Utilizing NFIP’s Risk Rating 2.0

The NWIP premium structure should reflect an individual property’s
actual risk to potential wildfire. This reflection is necessary to provide
adequate claim funding in the event of multiple widespread fire disasters.178
As a model, the program should observe and improve upon Risk Rating
2.0, an incoming NFIP reform that changes how the program calculates
premiums.179 The reformed program calculates premiums using individual
property characteristics,180 rather than solely assigning insurance rates to
properties based on their location within a mapped disaster risk area.181

177. See supra notes 123–130 and accompanying text.
178. See supra Part III.
179. RISK RATING 2.0 REPORT, supra note 132, at 7.
180. Id. at 9 (explaining that individual property characteristics include structural
variables (e.g., foundation type, height of the lowest floor,) and replacement cost value).
181. Id. at 1; Id. at 10 (stating that the reformed program will still use area
classification mapping to determine different floodplain categories and their respective
178
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Like the NFIP, current property insurance rates undervalue the risk
associated with wildfire risk and produce artificially low premiums.182
These rates encourage individuals to move to, and continue living in, areas
facing a foreseeable increase in natural disasters. Artificially low rates also
create inevitable deficit problems for any insurance program, because
reduced premiums will fail to cover costs during increasingly severe fire
seasons.183 The federal government must ensure that NWIP homeowner
premiums reflect the actual risk associated with living in a fire-prone area.
The NWIP should implement this risk rating structure to create a
system that ensures property owners receive a reward or penalty depending
on their maintenance and building choices. This individual approach will
also better allocate risk within the NWIP insurance pool, as property
owners with particularly high-risk characteristics will not be able to benefit
from a broadscale assignment of rates. Like the NFIP, this individual
calculation will still utilize a broader mapping tool to determine property
rate depending on relative risk.184
To create an accurate assessment for individual rate calculation, the
program must account for both community factors and individual property
characteristics. Michael Caggiano, Research Associate for the Colorado
Forest Restoration Institute, recommends the use of point-based WUI maps
that utilize “location and development data” to better identify at-risk WUI
areas.185 Point-based mapping assigns a risk value to each individual
building point-based on WUI components, like housing unit density,
vegetation cover, and proximity to large patches of contiguous wildland
vegetation.186 This mapping method is consistent with the goals of Risk

requirements). The reformed program will still use area classification mapping to determine
different floodplain categories and their respective requirements. Id.
182. See Patricia Gallagher & Devika Hazra, Do Insurance Premiums Put the Fire
Out?
Evidence
from
Los
Angeles
1–7
(2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3491339 (discussing the disconnect
between insurance premiums and actual wildfire risk).
183. Id.
184. See infra Part V(e).
185. Caggiano, supra note 32, at 13 (finding that “[p]oint-based WUI maps identified
a higher percentage of burned buildings as WUI compared to the census-based methods.
This suggests that, if the goal is to identify at-risk buildings, map developers can adjust WUI
mapping methods to align with the observed losses.”).
186. Id. This approach contrasts with USFS’ current census-based mapping, which
combines U.S. census data and the National Land Cover Dataset to characterize the WUI.
Susan Stewart et al., Defining the Wildland-Urban Interface, 105 J. FORESTRY 201, 203
(2007). See also Avi Bar-Massada et al., Using Structure Locations as a Basis for Mapping
the Wildland Urban Interface, 128 J. ENV’T MGMT. 540, 540 (2013) (“Our goal was to
develop a consistent method to map the WUI that is able to determine where neighborhoods
(or clusters of houses) exist, using just housing location and wildland fuel data . . . . We
conclude that this hybrid method is a useful alternative to zonal mapping from the
neighborhood to the landscape scale, and results in maps that are better suited to operational
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Rating 2.0 because it focuses on location characteristics specific to the
individual property. Further, NWIP premium calculations will supplement
point-based maps with broader individual property characteristics.
Insurance companies also possess risk maps and individual property
information to better calculate premium rates.
One major limitation to an accurate Risk Rating 2.0 calculation is the
NWIP’s ability to maintain updated WUI maps that account for changes in
vegetation and housing cover. Changes in vegetation cover can occur
quickly, and property development in the WUI will likely outpace the
program’s ability to create updated surveys of community and individual
property changes.
To remedy this, the subsidy program and annual rate recalculation
will help collect data to update NWIP risk maps. Homeowners seeking
subsidies will report the changes they performed on their property.
Additionally, the program should require participating communities to
inform FEMA of property development and changes in vegetation coverage
annually before each rate recalculation. The locality will also want to
ensure that they give an accurate update on community housing and
vegetation changes, because doing so may benefit their citizens’ individual
rates.
2.

Mandatory Purchase Requirement

To ensure that homeowners purchase wildfire insurance in
participating communities, the NWIP must require any property seeking a
federally-backed mortgage to purchase wildfire insurance. In NFIP
communities, the requirement to purchase flood insurance attaches to any
mortgage or financial action taken against a property using a federally
regulated entity.187 Another financial incentive to compel purchase could
include tying local receipt of federal funding to homeowner purchase of
insurance. This incentive could compel local government to educate and
engage local community members to increase overall risk perception and
spur wildfire insurance purchase in property owners not subject to a
mortgage or other property liability.
3.

Severe Repetitive-Loss Properties

The NWIP should also impose harsh regulations on a classification of
severe repetitive loss properties appropriate for WUI areas. One difficulty
in particularly fire-prone areas is the tendency for structures to burn and

fire management (e.g., fuels reduction) needs, while maintaining consistency with
conceptual and U.S. policy-specific WUI definitions.”).
187. See supra Part III(b).
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individuals to rebuild with insufficient fire mitigation to the property188;
however, this cycle of destruction is not as predictable for WUI areas. Fire
is more unpredictable than floodwaters, and in some cases, wildfire may
clear enough brush and dry fuel in an area to lessen its future risk.
To address the dual issue of fire unpredictability and repeat-loss
structures, the NWIP should fashion an SRL classification that accounts for
past property damage and the likelihood of future property damage. Past
property damage classifications could resemble the NFIP by targeting
properties that have experienced two or more claims exceeding property
value or else a number of claims exceeding a certain dollar amount (both
within a set period of time).189 In addition, a wildfire SRL could also require
some measurement of future fire susceptibility based on individual property
and broader fire zone vulnerability. Lastly, this SRL program should be
mandatory for all communities participating in the NWIP.190
The program could also require involuntary condemnation of severe
repetitive-loss properties. Federal and state governments possess the power
of eminent domain, if the exercise of private property acquisition is for a
“public purpose.”191 In his Brooklyn Law Review article, Attorney
Alexander Mendelson argues this approach to curb redevelopment and
create natural barriers in high-risk flood areas, noting that it also provides
an effective tool to “mitigate inevitable flood damage, avoid the persistent
problems of correlated loss, adverse selection, and moral hazard, and
properly allocate the burdens of flood damage.”192
To overcome these potential political consequences, the program
could offer additional funding to communities with a high number of
potential SRLs to undertake drastic fire-hardening measures and prevent
the possibility of destruction or condemnation in the next disaster.
Communities that are reluctant to participate in the program due to the high
number of SRLs can also work with FEMA to develop a Community
Wildfire Protection Plans (“CWPP”), as discussed infra Part V(d)(ii).
Additionally, the local government could engage property owners and

188. See Alexandre et al., supra note 76, at 147 (“In general, we found little evidence
though that homeowners or communities adapted to fire by changing the locations of
buildings, or by lowering rates of new development after the fire.”).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 4104c(h)(3) (defining SRLs as those with four or more claim
payments above $5,000 each, or at least two claims with a cumulative total exceeding
property value before destruction).
190. This position is contrary to the NFIP SRL program, which is optional for
participating communities. See NFIP REPORT, supra note 118, at 12.
191. Alexander S. Mendelson, Taking Away the Tightrope: Fixing the National
Flood Insurance Program Circus via Eminent Domain, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1519, 1534
(2018).
192. Id. at 1535.
181

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 2022

create outreach programs that incentivize fire-hardening and vegetation
clearance.193
4.

Using Subsidies to Encourage Fire-Hardening Property
a.

Insurance Subsidies and Fire-Hardening Assistance for the
Individual Property Owner

To mitigate the potential increase for wildfire insurance protection
after rate restructuring, the NWIP should offer subsidies to property owners
who implement certain preventative measures that increase structural fire
resistance. Preventative measures include the creation of defensible space,
changes to the positioning and type of flora planted on the property, and
structural changes to buildings on the property.194
Although local governments have some control over private property
through building and land use ordinances, it is difficult to monitor
compliance on private property. Moreover, measures that restrict private
property use are often politically unpopular in certain WUI settings. 195
Individual risk perception is also a key driver in wildfire preparation, and
the possibility of subsidizing rates will likely increase property owner
engagement.196
As a result, the NWIP should offer wildfire insurance subsidies to
lower individual property rates. By offering incentives to reduce potentially
expensive premiums, individual property owners who live in NWIP
communities will have more interest in undertaking fire prevention
measures at the individual structure level. By offering this incentive and
requiring land use and building code changes locally, the NWIP helps
provide a comprehensive local mitigation strategy.
b.

Subsidies for Low-Income WUI Property Owners

The NWIP should provide low-income property owners firehardening assistance grants to ensure access to the program’s insurance
subsidies. Income levels vary considerably in WUI property owners. For
example, Professor Shelby D. Green of Pace University Law School
observes two compounding phenomena facing cost-burdened residents in
areas increasingly vulnerable to natural disaster: an immediate effect of
“dislocation and displacement” and a subsequent economic effect resulting
193. See, e.g., Boulder Cnty., Colo.’s “Wildfire Partners” program. Our Program,
WILDFIRE PARTNERS, https://perma.cc/X3A3-22TH (explaining that the program provides
free assessments to qualified residents who want to fire-harden their home or surrounding
property). The program also provides financial awards to subsidize the cost of mitigation
efforts that use participating contractors. Id.
194. See sources cited supra note 17.
195. See generally Carroll et al., supra note 10.
196. Ghasemi et al., supra note 79, at 7–8.
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from increased rebuilding costs, increased insurance premiums, and
difficulty for low-income property owners to obtain decent mortgage
appraisals.197
Because the NWIP may create overall rate increases for many
communities, it must provide financial assistance to the underprivileged
citizens in the WUI who need fire-hardening assistance to their property
and combatting the economic costs of post-fire change. For example,
California recently proposed to allocate over $20 million in its 2021 budget
to the Office of Emergency Services “for the purposes of establishing a
financial assistance program to help low-income and disadvantaged
homeowners . . . as a part of a community-wide home hardening program
or effort.”198 Similarly, the NWIP can provide assistance to individuals who
meet low-income qualifications and want to make property modifications
that qualify for insurance subsidies. The program should also seek to
develop standards to provide fire-hardening assistance to owners of
multifamily properties that rent to low-income individuals.199
5.

Strict Land-Use Requirements for NWIP Communities
a.

Use “Fire Zones” To Create Scaled Ordinances that Minimize
Fire Spread and Help with Mitigation Strategy on Nonfederal
Public Land

The NWIP should create a scale that subdivides communities into
“fire zones” based on risk and applies respective building and vegetation
standards to reduce that zone’s particular vulnerability and exposure. For
example, Alexander Maranghides, Fire Protection Engineer for the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, and William Mell,
Research Combustion Engineer for the United States Forest Service,
created two exposure scales that measure the likelihood of combustion in a
community from fire exposure and ember exposure.200 To create the fire
and ember exposure scales, the study quantified community factors like

197. Shelby D. Green, Building Resilient Communities in the Wake of Climate
Change While Keeping Affordable Housing Safe from Sea Changes in Nature and Policy,
54 WASHBURN L.J. 527, 528 (2014).
198. S.B. 85 § 3, 2021 Leg. (Cal. 2021).
199. Although renters do not bear the burden of structural property loss in a wildfire
event, they risk the loss of their lives, personal property, cars, and an affordable home. Any
legislation that seeks to help low-income WUI residents should include multifamily property
owners in the discussion to ensure they are able to provide fire-hardening upgrades without
burdening renters with the cost.
200. ALEXANDER MARANGHIDES & WILLIAM MELL, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS &
TECH. NOTE 1748, U.S. DEP’T COM., FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THE NATIONAL
WILDLAND URBAN INTERFACE FIRE PROBLEM—DETERMINING FIRE AND EMBER EXPOSURE
ZONES USING A WUI HAZARD SCALE 4 (2012).
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surrounding fuel type, local weather, and topography.201 A similar scale
would allow the NWIP to better assist local communities in the
development of effective building and land use standards. In addition to the
factors used by Maranghides and Mell, the program exposure scale could
utilize historical local fire data and future exposure trends to determine
what restrictions may reduce community damage.
b.

Use Community Wildfire Protection Plans to Create Tailored
Ordinances

Local governments can also use CWPP to identify risk areas and
create effective local law that reflects broader state and federal wildfire
policy goals.202 CWPP programs “identif[y] and prioritize[] areas for
hazardous fuel reduction treatments and recommend the types and methods
of treatment on Federal and non-Federal land that will protect one or more
at-risk communities and essential infrastructure.”203 The USFS estimates
that less than 10% of communities facing wildfire risk have a developed
CWPP,204 indicating that there is significant room to create local fire plans
that better coordinate with state and federal officials and lead to better land
management outcomes.205 Given this low participation, the NWIP provides
a viable opportunity to facilitate the widespread creation of CWPPs. As a
result, the program should require the creation of a CWPP that works with
federal and state fire agencies to retain a flexible structure that changes as
“community capacity and other conditions change.”206 In addition, the
existence of a countywide or other large CWPP will offer municipalities a
basis for creating land use regulations that best fit the community and
protect it from larger adjacent wildlands.
c.

Offer Grants to State Governments and Local Governments
Participating in NWIP

NWIP should also implement a grant system that provides state and
local government resources to educate property owners about fire

201. Id. at 9, 13.
202. See 16 U.S.C. § 6511(3).
203. Id.
204. How To Create a Community Wildfire Protection Plan, U.S. FIRE ADMIN.:
COFFEE BREAK BULLETIN (June 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/WU7U-TYAP.
205. See e.g., PAMELA J. JAKES ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., GEN. TECH. REP. NRS-89,
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR CREATING A COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PROTECTION PLAN
20 (2012) (recommending that local communities seeking to reduce fire across a broad area
create plans that “forge valuable new relationships and coordination among federal, state,
and county fire management officers”).
206. U.S. FIRE ADMIN., supra note 204.
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prevention and finance larger community fire prevention initiatives.207
Additionally, the NWIP could permit states to administer funding for the
low-income residential subsidy program, as discussed supra Part V(c)(ii).
Although the NWIP assists WUI communities through regulation
development and insurance coverage, the program should also provide state
and local governments with assistance to develop fire-hardening plans on
public property. WUI communities that oversee nonfederal wildlands play
an equally important role in creating defensible space within the
community. Additionally, communities will likely need assistance firehardening public buildings, infrastructure, and providing general education
to the public about the property changes associated with the introduction of
NWIP into the community. Lastly, the grants should help state and local
fire agencies develop prescribed burn and fuel reduction CWPPs that
protect WUI communities at large. This grant system will help prevent
reactive behavior to wildfire and encourage communities to put effort
toward prevention and risk mitigation.
6.

Offer the Option To Condemn Property Voluntarily

The NWIP should create a comprehensive and attractive voluntary
buyout program to draw homeowners away from the WUI. Many argue that
buyouts offer “maybe the quickest, most politically expedient way to
address the most notorious [SRL] properties” under the NFIP. 208 This
proposition is also true for WUI areas facing increased wildfire frequency
and severity. The growing wildfire season is creating prolonged instability
for many WUI residents due to repeated evacuations, power shut-offs, and
prolonged exposure to toxic wildfire smoke. Although WUI residents often
have strong ties to their community and land, the presence of these threats
may prompt some citizens to relocate.
Voluntary buyouts for structures in high-risk wildfire areas may
garner significant popularity for existing residents. However, the federal
government must make the option available in any broader plan to mitigate
loss in future wildfire events. For example, NFIP adopted a voluntary
buyout methodology known as the Upton-Jones Amendment, allowing
property owners to collect their NFIP insurance claims “to relocate or
demolish buildings imminently threatened by coastal (and riverine) erosion
prior to any damages actually occurring.”209 Despite this incentive, the
207. The federal government currently runs the “Fire Management Assistance Grant
Program” to assist states with firefighting response activities, providing a 75/25 federal/state
cost-sharing structure. 44 C.F.R. §§ 204.21, 204.61 (2021). The NWIP grant program would
provide separate assistance that focuses on fire mitigation and prevention activities.
208. Thomas Ruppert et al., Managing Property Buyouts at the Local Level: Seeking
Benefits and Limiting Harms, 48 ENV’T L. REP. 10520, 10521 (2018).
209. Mark Crowell et al., Evaluation of Coastal Erosion Hazards Study: An
Overview, J. COASTAL RSCH., Spring 1999, Special Issue No. 28, at 4 (stating that the
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program garnered little support and instead allowed property owners to
benefit from demolition payments that drove up program costs, forcing
Congress to repeal the amendment in 1994.210
Although the Upton-Jones Amendment did not succeed for floodplain
management, its basic model is a viable option for property owners facing
a high wildfire risk. Using mapping data gathered for individual NWIP
participant rates, FEMA could develop criteria to identify the highest-risk
structures in a given community. The agency could then offer these
property owners buyout options that include full reimbursement and
relocation costs. Although this program may face the same expense burden
that plagued the Upton-Jones Amendment, the skyrocketing cost of federal
fire suppression may justify spending large sums to relocate willing WUI
participants.211
7.

Maintain a Role for Private Insurers

The NWIP should also not disclose the participation of private
insurers in the program. Instead, the program should incentivize private
competition by offering its own baseline alternative rate.212 Although there
is some fear that communities will avoid participation in the NWIP, if
private insurance offers standalone or bundled wildfire policies, such
avoidance is unlikely given the continuing rise in property insurance nonrenewals within wildfire areas. Rather, the different offerings will
incentivize the private insurance industry to develop its own rate reduction
structure to match the possible subsidies property owners can receive
through NWIP policies.

PART VI: FORESEEABLE CHALLENGES FOR THE NWIP
Although the NWIP provides a solution to residents facing nonrenewals or unaffordable property insurance rates, it will likely face
program allowed insureds to opt for either relocation payment up to 40% of the structure
value or demolition payment up to 100% of the structure value, plus 10% of the value for
demolition cost. FEMA or a state authority must also determine the structure is within a
zone of “imminent collapse.”).
210. Id. (finding that in the program’s six-year tenure, less than a thousand
homeowners filed claims and that FEMA only approved 581 of them).
211. For example, California is already considering a buyout program for coastal real
estate that faces inevitable sea rise. See, e.g., Nathan Rott, California Has a New Idea for
Homes at Risk from Rising Seas: Buy, Rent, Retreat, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 21, 2021,
7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/N37X-C3HD.
212. KOUSKY ET AL., supra note 23, at 42 (discussing the implications of allowing
private insurers to compete with NFIP policies); “the impacts of more substantial private
sector growth, if that emerges, have been debated. Some worry about loss of the highest
priced policies undermining the financial stability of the NFIP. Others argue any shedding
of policies to the private sector should be on net positive for the NFIP.” Id.
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significant political hurdles at the local, state, and federal levels. Although
any broadscale overhaul like the NWIP will contain shortcomings, this Part
highlights the major obstacles to the program’s success.

A. LOW INITIAL TAKE-UP RATES
One problem that will face the NWIP is a low take-up rate by WUI
communities.213 Although community risk perception is increasing in the
face of disastrous fire seasons, residents will likely resist the additional
insurance requirement.214 There will likely be significant pushback from
consumer advocacy groups and local politicians alike to voice WUI citizen
resistance to the program. However, participants are essential in this
program to create a large enough coverage pool that can sustain inevitable
wildfire claims in the forthcoming seasons.
To solve this issue, the NWIP could require a local enforcement
mechanism in its agreement with a community to provide wildfire
insurance. The program could provide funding to localities that either
expands the role of building and zoning code enforcement teams or creates
a new role that enforces local fire insurance and code requirements. This
dedicated enforcement would better ensure that residents adhere to local
wildfire insurance requirements, proper building code requirements, and
zoning laws crafted for wildfire mitigation.
Although it is a matter for separate discussion, the federal government
could also replace the current role of state FAIR plans and provide similar
last resort property coverage on the federal level.215 This would better
ensure a large risk pool by combining current FAIR plan participants with
additional citizens in communities that opt for this new form of coverage.
However, the intent of the NWIP is not to provide a last resort property
coverage option, but rather to sever the cost of wildfire damage from
existing property insurance plans and address the growing skepticism of
private insurance to participate in high-risk fire areas.

B. HIGH VALUE OF PROPERTY IN MUCH OF WUI
A potential problem facing the NWIP is the high monetary value of
many homes in the WUI and the disparity between WUI property values
within states. The relative cost of homes in the WUI depends on the state
and the specific region. In some western states, like Colorado and Nevada,

213. Reilly’s proposal solves this dilemma by preempting other wildfire coverage
and requiring a “homeowner mandate” for individuals who do not participate. Reilly, supra
note 150, at 561–62.
214. Resistance would likely come from individuals in higher-risk fire areas that
have yet to experience a disaster, and from individuals in WUI communities in areas that
are not historically susceptible to wildfire but face an increased risk forecast.
215. This last resort coverage option echoes French’s national catastrophe insurance
program. See French, supra note 88.
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WUI homes are more valuable than the average, whereas in Arizona and
Oregon, they are worth less than the average.216 In California, there is a
large range of property values and residential housing types in areas
considered WUI,217 although the values of many homes in WUI regions
closer to major metropolitan areas can often exceed $1 million for a
residential property.218 The presence of expensive homes in the WUI makes
the idea of subsidy incentives less appealing politically, creates a possibility
of loss for an insurance company with policies in a wealthy WUI area, and
may unfairly burden the rates of lower-value WUI properties that
participate in the program when wealthy communities rebuild in high-risk
areas.
One way to combat this burden is a mandatory condemnation
requirement. If wealthy communities participating in the program live in
too high risk of an area and rebuild after disaster, this condemnation
requirement will force rethinking on where to locate the community and
minimize the chance of repeated high-dollar disaster claims.
Additionally, high-value residential communities may provide the
risk pool with significant funding if the program ties premium rates to a
property’s replacement cost. Homeowners who live in less wealthy WUI
communities may actually benefit from these high-value community
payments because they will help lessen the NWIP’s deficit risk. Affluent
WUI communities are generally supportive of fire hazard mitigation and
thus may face a lower risk during a given wildfire season that affects all
WUI communities.219

C. APPROPRIATING FUNDS TO THIS PROGRAM WHILE STILL
PROVIDING FUNDS FOR ENTRENCHED FIRE SUPPRESSION

Funding is also a major question surrounding the NWIP, as the
program engages federal, state, local, and private entities to enact its goals.
216. Grabar, supra note 74.
217. Fires occur in areas like the Oakland Hills, Malibu, Santa Barbara, and Southern
Orange County (where home prices easily exceed $1 million). Fires also spread in areas like
the Sierra foothills, Central Coast, San Bernardino foothills, and rural mountain counties
(where home prices are significantly lower than Bay Area and Southland urban and
suburban WUI areas).
218. Aware of this disparity within the broad “WUI” category of California, Gregory
L. Simon proposes the use of an “affluence-vulnerability index” to complement the WUI by
measuring who is vulnerable, what characterizes this vulnerability, where the most
vulnerable areas in a community are located, and what events create this elevated risk.
SIMON, supra, note 83, at 31. This index would evaluate the vulnerabilities and risks facing
individual households beyond property characteristics and could possibly “reveal[]
community attributes and behaviors that reduce other modalities of risk.” Id. at 101. To sum
up this point, a resident affected by the 1991 Oakland Hills Fire stated, “If your house is
going to burn, be sure that it does with three thousand of your neighbors’ in a major media
market.” Id.
219. See Carroll et al., supra note 10, at 5.
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The federal government already spends a record amount on fire suppression
and provides states with grant funding at the time a wildfire strikes.220 As
a result, legislative advocates of the NWIP must stress the importance of
the program as a long-term preventative solution to America’s growing
wildfire problem. To support this assertion, advocates should cite the
expeditious rise of wildfire in the West and general increase in fires across
other WUI areas in the country. This argument should accompany research
demonstrating long-term cost benefits of the program to justify the large
upfront cost of undertaking a new insurance program. Although the
program will require significant investment, the intent is to create
preventative and mitigatory strategies that will drive down federal fire
suppression cost over time.

CONCLUSION
Any successful long-term solution to manage and mitigate wildfire in
the western WUI should account for the people, settlement, and
development that will remain in the area despite increasing exposure to
wildfire. The broad, multijurisdictional, and unpredictable nature of
wildfire warrants a solution from the federal level that invokes private,
local, and state cooperation. The NWIP will facilitate this engagement and
ensure that preventative measures occur beyond federal lands alone.
Additionally, this program will ensure that residents of the WUI do not face
underinsurance or non-renewal, but rather will receive accurate rates with
the opportunity to subsidize cost in exchange for fire-hardening property.
Although recent problems with the NFIP caution the use of a federal
program to provide insurance for an increasingly correlated risk like
wildfire, such a program can operate without significant debt, if the initial
policy components are strict enough to prevent repeated damage claims,
encourage mitigation, and provide accurate risk premiums.

220. Jingjing Liang et al., Factors influencing large wildland fire suppression
expenditures, 17 INT’L J. WILDLAND FIRE 650, 650 (2008) (“Since the new millennium, the
federal government has spent on average over US$1 billion per year on suppression, while
its annual expenditures from 1970 to 2000 averaged below US$400 million (all expenditures
in 2005 US dollars).”); Fire Management Assistance Grants, supra note 59.
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